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CASENOTES
THE PRACTICE OF PEDIATRICS IN PEDAGOGY? THE
COSTLY COMBINATION IN CEDAR RAPIDS
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GARRET F.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")' was
enacted in 1975 to ensure that all children with disabilities, like
their nondisabled counterparts, have access to a free appropriate
public education designed to meet their unique needs This
"appropriate education" mandate emphasizes the necessity of
providing such children with special education and "related ser-
vices,"' and federal funding is offered to state and local educational
agencies to assist in implementing this objective.4
Since it is impossible for Congress to enumerate all the circum-
stances in which schools are required to provide special education
services for disabled students, many of the IDEA's provisions,
established to guide state and local educational agencies in imple-
menting its requirements, are imprecise. Consequently, courts are
often petitioned to make determinations as to the meaning of these
provisions on a case-by-case basis.5
One provision of the IDEA that has created particular difficulty
in both interpretation and administration is the requirement that
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The IDEA was also known as the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
2. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3. Id.
4. See id. §§ 1411-1413 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
5. See generally Note,EnforcingtheRight to an "Appropriate"Education: The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979) (discussing the
difficulties in interpreting the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, now known as the
IDEA).
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school districts provide "related services."' Under the statute,
"related services" are those services that are required to enable a
disabled child to benefit from special education, and include medical
services only to the extent that they are used for diagnosis and
evaluation purposes, or they are otherwise excluded.7
The Department of Education regulations further expanded this
notion of "related services" by distinguishing "school health services"
that can be "provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified
person"' from "medical services" that are "provided by a licensed
physician to determine a child's medically related disability."9
Absent from the statutory language, however, is a clarification as to
whether specialized nursing services, resembling medical treatment,
qualify as "school health services" that must be provided under the
IDEA or as "medical services" that are instead exempt.'0
Courts have thus attempted to devise a' standard for defining
"related services" to determine whether costly, continuous nursing
care falls within or outside the scope of the IDEA. In Irving
Independent School District v. Tatro," the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held that clean intermittent catheterization ("CIC")
was a "related service," concluding that the Secretary of Education
had reasonably determined that "medical services" referred to
services that cannot be performed by anyone other than a physician
and not to "school health services." 2 Since the CIC procedure is
6. See generally Haekyoung Suh, Note, The Need for Consistency in Interpreting the
Related Provision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 48 RUTGERS L. REv.
1321 (1996).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997). The IDEA defines "related services" as:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including
rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical
services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability
to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and
assessment of disabling conditions in children.
Id. This list, however, is not exhaustive.
8. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(12) (1999).
9. Id. § 300.24(b)(4) (1999).
10. See Sub, supra note 6, at 1324 (citing Deciding If a Related Service Is Medical or
Educational, SPEcIAL EDUCATOR, Aug. 30, 1996, at 1, 4).
11. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
12. See id. at 888-95. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, but only as to
the matter of awarding attorney's fees. They concurred in finding that the school was required
to provide catheterization as a medical service. See id. at 896 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens,
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often performed by a nurse, the school district was required to
provide the service under the IDEA.'3 The Court indirectly dealt
with the issue of cost, offering in dicta the opinion that the medical
services exclusion "was designed to spare schools from an obligation
to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and
beyond the range of their competence."14
While several lower courts have read Tatro as requiring a
physician-based, bright-line test regardless of cost, 5 many others
determined that a service is not a "related service" when it becomes
an extraordinary medical need and its cost becomes too
burdensome. 6 In its most recent decision on this issue, however, the
Supreme Court, in Cedar Rapids Community School District v.
Garret F.,'7 explicitly rejected a similar cost-based, multi-factor test
proposed by the school district in considering whether the IDEA's
definition of "related services" required the district to provide a
ventilator-dependent student with continuous nursing services
during school hours. 8 The Court ruled that the school district must
provide a full-time, one-on-one nurse, finding no reason to depart
from Tatro's precedent, and presumably resolving any statutory
ambiguity for special education agencies.' 9
This casenote explores the Supreme Court's decision in Cedar
Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., appraising its
economic impact on educators and students alike as schools attempt
to offer "related services," medical-in-nature, while maintaining a
free and appropriate public special education for all disabled
children under the IDEA. Part II traces the varying weight federal
courts have given to cost considerations in cases involving "related
service" claims prior to and following Tatro, prefacing the Supreme
Court's decision to hear Garret F. Part III examines the procedural
and substantive history of Garret F., following its course from
administrative hearing to Supreme Court, and focusing on courts'
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. See id. at 894-95.
14. Id. at 892.
15. See, e.g., Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824,826
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
16. See generally Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost
Be a Factor in Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 13 (1992).
17. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
18. See id. at 995.
19. See id. at 998.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:305
views of Tatro's precedent. Lastly, Part IV evaluates the Garret F.
decision and the impact it will have on similar claims involving the
increasingly exorbitant expenses of school health-related services as
well as on special education programs nationwide.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE TATRO
"RELATED SERVICES" TEST
A. Rowley: Equal Access v. Equal Opportunity
In interpreting and applying the definition of "related services" in
special education cases, federal courts have taken an irresolute
route in the two decades since the IDEA was initially enacted. The
Supreme Court set forth some peripheral guidelines in Board of
Education v. Rowley,2" the first case in which the Court interpreted
any provision of the IDEA.2
In this case, the parents of a hearing-impaired student, who
received personalized tutoring and supportive services in a regular,
participating New York public school, unsuccessfully sued local
school officials, claiming that the school district's denial of a
qualified sign language interpreter in all of the student's academic
classes violated her access to a free appropriate public education.22
The Court, in reviewing the language and legislative history of the
IDEA, maintained that simply because a student could benefit from
"related services" did not inherently compel a school district to
provide them. Where disabled students are provided with mean-
ingful access to educational programs, school districts are not
required to furnish them with every related service needed to
maximize their educational potential.24 The Court noted that
Congress could not have intended to impose such a significant
financial burden upon state and local agencies unless it did so
unambiguously.25
20. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
21. See Perry Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v.
Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REV. 466, 467 (1983).
22. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184-86.
23. See id. at 199.
24. See id. at 198.
25. See id. at 190 n.11.
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B. Tatro and its Two-Part Test
The Supreme Court narrowed its definition of a "related service"
two years later in Irving Independent School District v. Tatro26 by
announcing a two-step analysis.2 First, a court must determine
whether a service constitutes a "'supportive servic[e] ... required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education" within
the meaning of the IDEA.28 Second, if a service is supportive, a court
must then ascertain whether it is excluded from coverage as a
"medical service" that serves "purposes other than diagnosis or
evaluation."29 In deciding whether a supportive service is medical,
the Court relied on the federal definition of a "medical service,""°
concluding that if the services are provided by a licensed physician
and are not for diagnostic or evaluative purposes, the services are
excludable.3" However, services that can be provided by a nurse or
a qualified layperson are not excluded.32
Eight-year-old Amber Tatro, as a result of spina bifida, was
unable to voluntarily empty her bladder and had to be catheterized
every few hours to avoid injury to her kidneys.33 The catheterization
was a simple procedure that could be performed safely with the
assistance of a school nurse or a layperson with little training.34
Relying more upon the professional position of the person perform-
ing the service than the nature and expense of it, the Court viewed
the procedure as more similar to a "school health service" than a
medical one, and determined that it qualified as a "related
service."35 The Court further held that without such assistance,
Amber would have been unable to attend school and, therefore,
26. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
27. See id. at 890.
28. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17)).
29. Id.
30. Medical services constitute "services provided by a licensed physician to determine
a child's medically related disability that results in the child's need for special education and
related services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(4) (1999).
31. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891-92.
32. See id. at 892; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(12) (1999) (defining "school health
services").
33. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 891; see also Ann Rozycki, Comment & Note, Related Services under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:Health Care Services for Students with Complex
Health Care Needs, 1996 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 67, 76 (1996).
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would have been denied access to a free and appropriate public
education.36
The Court nullified the clarity of its physician-based test,
however, by noting in dicta that the Department of Education's
definition of "medical services" was a reasonable interpretation of
congressional intent "to spare schools from an obligation to provide
a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the
range of their competence."" Congress further included the "medical
services" exclusion and limited it to the services of a physician or
hospital, according to the Court, due to their "far more expensive"
nature compared to school nursing services. 8 By alluding to the
existence of a fiscal factor, the Court enabled school districts to
justify their refusal to provide assistance to severely disabled
children in school. 9
C. Post-Tatro Litigation
Several lower courts have followed Tatro's physician-based,
bright-line test.4" Most courts, however, have held that health care
services do not constitute "related services" when they are more
costly and complicated than catheterization.4 Such lawsuits
typically require schools to hire additional full-time nursing
personnel to care for technology-dependent children, often at a
36. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890.
37. Id. at 892.
38. Id. at 893.
39. See, e.g., Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991)
("Congress intended the states to balance the competing interests of economic necessity, on
the one hand, and the special needs of a handicapped child, on the other, when making
education placement decisions."); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin.
Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1990) (justifying a school's refusal to pay for
psychiatric hospitalization on the ground that it would impose an undue financial burden);
Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1027 (D. Utah 1992) (finding that the
Tatro test does not require a school district to provide every health service not furnished by
a licensed physician); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 75 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (interpreting
the Tatro holding as a balancing of interests test); Detsel v. Board of Educ., 637 F. Supp.
1022,1026 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affdper curiam, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987) (using dicta in Tatro
to conclude that "medical services which would entail great expense are not required").
40. See, e.g., Skelly v. Brookfield LaGrange Park Sch. Dist. 95,968 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
41. See Allen G. Osborne, Jr., Where Will the Supreme Court Draw the Line Between
Medical and School Health Services under the IDEA?, 128 EDUC. L. REP. 559,561-62 (1998).
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substantial cost to the district." Seizing on the dicta in Tatro, these
courts instead have applied an undue burden, multi-factor, balanc-
ing test in which they have examined the frequency, duration, and
intensity of the service, as well as the cost and degree of training
required to provide the service.4" Accordingly, the majority of these
courts have determined that the services of a full-time nurse more
closely resemble "medical services" than "school health services" and
are thus exempt.'
1. Full-Time Nursing Services Excluded as "Medical Services"
The issue of cost was considered by the U. S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York in Detsel v. Board of Education45 in
1986. The extensive nursing services required by seven-year-old
Melissa Detsel, which included continual respirator assistance and
a steady supply of oxygen, did not fall within a category of "related
services" covered by the IDEA.46 Her condition demanded constant
supervision by an individual trained to monitor her health in order
for her to attend school.4 The district court ruled that such full-time
nursing services did not clearly fall within the Tatro test, but it
nevertheless determined that the exclusion of such services was
consistent with the spirit of the regulation, as they were more akin
to medical services than to school health services." The court
reasoned that the provision of constant nursing care would subject
the schools to the "excessive costs and the burden of health care."49
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, dismissing the statutory
language and necessity of services, and choosing to focus instead on
the proper balance of the nature, extent, and cost of the services."
Similarly, in Bevin H. v. Wright,5 a federal district court in
Pennsylvania held that services provided to a seven-year-old
disabled girl were too extensive to be considered "related services."52
42. See id. at 562.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 561.
45. 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), affd per curiam, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
46. See id. at 1023, 1026-27.
47. See id. at 1023.
48. See id. at 1027.
49. Id.
50. See Detsel v. Board of Educ., 820 F.2d 587, 588 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
51. 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
52. See id. at 76.
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Bevin, a legally blind child with severe mental and physical
disabilities, required a tracheostomy tube to breathe and a
gastrostomy tube to eat and receive medication, as well as the
administration of a constant supply of oxygen.13 Her needs de-
manded the constant surveillance of a nurse at the cost of approxi-
mately $1850 per month.54 Bevin, like Melissa Detsel, argued that
the provision of services should depend on the status of the health
care provider and not on the nature and extent of the services.55 The
court, however, balanced the competing interests-the extent of
services, the time commitment, and the costs involved-and deter-
mined that her services would impose an undue burden on the
school district "in the guise of 'related services."'56
In Granite School District v. Shannon M.," a federal district court
in Utah also rejected Tatro's physician-based, "related services"
classification as too narrow, stating that a service "'does not become
instantly "related" when it can be implemented by persons other
than licensed physicians."' 8 Shannon, a six-year-old wheelchair-
bound kindergartner, suffered from congenital neuromuscular
atrophy and severe scoliosis."9 Her condition required that someone
with the qualifications of a licensed practical nurse be available to
her at all times, at a cost of $30,000 per year.6" After examining the
nature and extent of the requested service, the court determined
that the constant nursing care required by Shannon fell within the
"medical services" exclusion of the IDEA because it overburdened
the school district.61 The court concluded that Tatro did not "stand
for the proposition that all health services performed by someone
other than a licensed physician are related services under the Act
regardless of the amount of care, expense, or burden on the school
system and, ultimately, on other school children."62
53. See id. at 72-73.
54. See id. at 72.
55. See id. at 74.
56. Id. at 75.
57. 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992).
58. Id. at 1027 (quoting Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office ofAdmin. Hearings,
903 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1990)).
59. See id. at 1022.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 1029-30.
62. Id. at 1026.
PEDIATRICS IN PEDAGOGY
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also looked to
additional factors in Neely v. Rutherford County School 63 in 1995.
The court examined the nature and extent of the services provided
as well as "the risk involved and the liability factor of the school
district inherent in providing a service,"' and reversed a district
court's ruling that ordered the school district to provide the
requested services.65 The Sixth Circuit alternatively found that
hiring a full-time nurse or respiratory-care professional for
Samantha Neely, who suffered from a rare condition that caused
breathing difficulties and required constant monitoring due to the
life-threatening nature of the illness, was inherently burden-
some-not because of the cost, but because of the nature of the care
necessary.66 The court reasoned that "the application of the medical
services exclusion depends on who provides the service and the
burdens associated therewith," 7 and interpreted Tatro to mean that
a school district is not required to provide every service that is
"medical in nature," especially when it entails hiring a health care
professional to assist just one student.6"
The Tatro test was further renounced in Fulginiti v. Roxbury
Township Public Schools,69 a 1996 New Jersey case in which a
student named Carissa, who had severe multiple disabilities,
requested that a specially trained person constantly monitor her
tracheostomy tube and provide suctioning when needed." The
district court upheld an administrative law judge's findings that the
training required was similar to that received by a nurse and that
the school nurse or teacher could not be expected to perform the
necessary services."1 It ruled that because Carissa's care was
medical in nature and unduly burdensome, the nursing services
extended beyond the scope of a "related service.7 2
63. 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995), overruled by Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v.
Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
64. Id. at 971.
65. See id. at 973.
66. See id. at 967, 972.
67. Id. at 970.
68. See id. at 971-72.
69. 921 F. Supp. 1320 (D.N.J. 1996).
70. See id. at 1321.
71. See id. at 1321-22, 1326.
72. See id. at 1325-26.
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2. Full-Time Nursing Services Included as "Related Services"
Aside from Garret F., the only other case concerning full-time, in-
school nursing care is Morton Community Unit School District No.
709 v. J.M.,8 in which a federal district court in Illinois eschewed
the rationale of Detsel and its progeny as ignoring the Supreme
Court's directive in Tatro and the spirit of the IDEA.74 The court
held that a school district was required to provide a student with a
full-time nurse.75 J.M. suffered from a number of severe medical
conditions, used a portable ventilator system, and had tracheostomy
and gastrostomy tubes. 6 As a result, he required a pediatric nurse
or other trained individual to attend to his needs throughout the
school day. " The court, using Tatro's bright-line test, found that the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that J.M. required
"school health services," not "medical services," because he did not
require the services of a physician while he attended school.7"
Moreover, the school district was not necessarily overburdened by
providing the services, as J.M.'s former school district had provided
him with these health services for a number of years without any
excess burden.79 The court asserted that "if Morton objects to the
obligations imposed by the IDEA, then it should take that grievance
up with the legislature not the judiciary." °
III. CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GARRET F.
It was upon this backdrop that the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.8
By granting certiorari, the Court ostensibly would attempt to clarify
the scope of the "medical services" exception to the "related services"
73. 986 F. Supp. 1112 (C.D. 111. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1998).
74. See id. at 1125.
75. See id. at 1125-26.
76. See id. at 1115.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1123. Although the district court applied the bright-line test, the Seventh
Circuit, in its affirmance, declined to adopt either this approach or a balancing test. See
Morton Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 1998).
79. See Morton, 986 F. Supp. at 1124.
80. Id.
81. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
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provision of the IDEA.82 It would also be the first case at that level
to directly address the issue of cost in a special education claim-a
matter of great significance due to the increasing expenses involved
in providing continuous nursing care.
A. Facts
Due to a childhood accident that left him a quadriplegic and
ventilator-dependent, Garret Frey required a personal attendant to
be within hearing distance of him throughout the school day to
monitor his health.83 The attendant's duties included urinary
bladder catheterization, post-tracheotomy suctioning to maintain a
clear airway, repositioning, observation for respiratory distress, and
blood pressure monitoring.84 Since Garret's mental capabilities
remained unaffected by his physical disabilities, he was able to
attend regular classes in the Cedar Rapids Community School
District."
Garret's family provided the personal attendant from kindergar-
ten through the fourth grade.8 Upon his entrance into the fifth
grade, however, the family requested that the school district provide
the needed nursing services.8" The school district refused, asserting
that it was not responsible for providing such intensive and
extensive care."
The school district, one of the largest in Iowa, operated approxi-
mately thirty-three schools for approximately 17,500 students, of
whom approximately 2200 received special education services.8 9 It
employed six full-time registered nurses to serve all of its students
and schools, but no building had a registered nurse continuously on-
site." The district did not provide one-on-one care for any other
student, and was already providing a full-time educational aide to
82. See John W. Borkowski &Alexander E. Dreier, The 1997-98 Term of the United States
Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, 129 EDUC. L. REP. 887, 916 (1998)
(discussing the conflicting interpretations of Tatro among the circuits).
83. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 995.
84. See id. at 995 n.3.
85. See id. at 995.
86. See id. at 995-96.
87. See id. at 996.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Brief for the Petitioner, 1998 WL 375420, at *6, Cedar Rapids Community Sch.
Dist. v. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999) (No. 96-1793).
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assist Garret in moving about the building.91 Due to his life-
threatening disabilities, however, the district could not entrust the
continuous monitoring of Garret to anyone other than a licensed
practical nurse.92 The parties stipulated that it would cost at least
$27,000 to hire a special nurse for Garret.9 3
B. Procedural History
Both an administrative law judge ("AJ") and the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa determined that the
requested nursing services were not within the scope of the "medical
services" exclusion and that the school district, therefore, was
required to provide them as "related services."94 The ALJ followed
the bright-line reasoning in Tatro that only services that require the
special training, knowledge, and judgment of a physician were
excluded from the "related services" mandate. The school district
appealed.
Applying Tatro's two-part analysis for determining whether a
service is a "related service" under the IDEA,96 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.9" In a rather succinct opinion, the court first held that the
requested services were supportive, as Garret, like Amber Tatro,
would not have been able to attend school and would not, therefore,
have been able to benefit from special education had these services
not been received.9" Second, the court interpreted Tatro as establish-
ing a bright-line test for resolving the question of whether the
services are "medical."99 Services that must be provided by a
licensed physician and are neither diagnostic nor evaluative are
subject to the "medical services" exclusion, but services that can be
provided in the school setting by a nurse or qualified layperson are
not.' In the former instance, the school is not responsible for
91. See id. at *6.
92. See id. at *7.
93. See id. at *6.
94. See id.
95. See Garret F., 199 S. Ct. at 996.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
97. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir.
1997).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 824-25.
100. See id.; see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-95 (1984).
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providing the services, whereas in the latter, it is. Thus, the court
ruled that since Garret's required services were provided by a nurse
and not by a physician, they were not "medical services" but were
"school health services" that the school district had to provide. 1' In
so doing, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that several judicial
decisions did not accept this bright-line analysis, but it considered
itself bound by the Tatro precedent.
10 2
The school district appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court,
challenging only the second part of the Eighth Circuit's analysis-the
application of Tatro's bright-line test.10 3 The school district asserted
that the court should have instead applied a multi-factor test,
similar to the one in Detsel that considered the nature and extent of
the services involved.0 4 Pointing to the individualized and continu-
ous nature of Garret's requested care, the district suggested that the
case's outcome should have been influenced by a number of factors,
including the type of care and its relative time constraints, the
district's personnel resources, the cost of the services, and the
potential consequences should the services be improperly
performed.'0 5
C. Majority Opinion
In a seven-two decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the
majority, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth
Circuit.' '6 The Court held that under the statutory language of the
IDEA's "related services" definition, Tatro precedent, and the
overarching spirit of the regulation, the school district was required
to provide Garret with the nursing services he needed during school
hours. 07
101. See Garret F., 106 F.3d at 825.
102. See id. Citing Detsel, among others, the court expressed its reasoning for rejecting
these authorities, stating: '[Tihese courts rely on dicta in Tatro in order to factor into the
medical services exclusion considerations of the nature and extent of the services performed.
The court declines to seize dicta in Tatro to go beyond the physician/non-physician test which
the Supreme Court sets forth therein." Id.
103. See Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992, 997 (1999).
104. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 50.
105. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 998.
106. See id. at 994, 1000.
107. See id. at 1000.
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1. The Court Upholds the Tatro Bright-Line Test
Proclaiming that its "endorsement" of the so-called physician-
based, bright-line test in Tatro was "unmistakable," °8 the Court
rejected the school district's argument that the nursing services
requested by Garret were "medical services" excluded under the
"related services" provision of the IDEA. The Court began its two-
step, related-service analysis0 9 by first determining that the
nursing services at issue in the case were "supportive services" in
that they enabled Garret to remain in school during the day and
provided him with meaningful access to special education."' The
Court then turned to its interpretation of the "medical services"
exclusion under the IDEA."' Justice Stevens swept aside prior
Detsel-line decisions by conclusively declaring that the "scope of the
'medical services' exclusion is not a matter of first impression in this
Court" because in Tatro "we concluded that the Secretary of
Education had reasonably determined that the term... referred
only to services that must be performed by a physician, and not to
school health services."" 2 The Court stated that it referenced cost
and competence in dicta solely "as justifications for drawing a line
between physician and other services,""' and that the term "medical
services," as used in the IDEA, does not include all forms of care
that could loosely be described as "medical" elsewhere." 4 Thus,
"medically-related" services are not necessarily excluded from the
scope of "related services" under the IDEA.
2. The Combined and Continuous Character of the Services is
Irrelevant
Although the school district conceded that Garret's needs did not
exceed the scope of the IDEA when considered individually, it
argued that collectively, the continuous character of the services
did." 5 In summarily rejecting the school district's four-factored
108. Id. at 997.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
110. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 997.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 998.
115. See id.
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proposal, however, the Court countered that the services Garret
required, though more extensive, were no more "medical" than the
care required by Amber Tatro." 6 The school district offered no
explanation as to why these characteristics might make these
services more "medical." l" The Court reasoned that continuous
services might be more costly and might require additional school
personnel, but these circumstances did not make the services more
"medical."" 8 The continuous character of the services associated
with Garret's ventilator dependency thus had no apparent relation-
ship to "medical" services, according to the Court."' In further
concluding that the "multi-factor test [was] not supported by any
recognized source of legal authority," the Court found no cause to
deviate from the settled law of Tatro.2 °
3. Undue Financial Burden Is Also Irrelevant
Finally, the Court rejected the school district's argument concern-
ing the financial burden that it had to bear in providing the services
that Garret needed to remain in school.' 2' Although the Court
acknowledged that "the potential financial burdens imposed on
participating States may be relevant to arriving at a sensible
construction of the IDEA," the Court specifically repudiated the
establishment of an "undue-burden exemption" based on economic
considerations in this case.'22 Justice Stevens went on to state that
since Congress made no mention of cost in its definition of "related
services," to use a cost-based standard as the sole test for determin-
ing the scope of the provision would require the Court "to engage in
judicial lawmaking without any guidance from Congress" and might
"create... tension with the purposes of the IDEA."2 '
116. See id
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 999.
122. Id. 'Defining 'related services' in a manner that accommodates the cost concerns
Congress may have had is altogether different from using cost itself as the definition." Id.
(citation omitted). But see Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982)
(recognizing that Congress did not intend to impose "upon the States a burden of unspecified
proportions and weight" in enacting the IDEA); see also cases cited supra note 39.
123. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 999.
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D. Justice Thomas's Dissent
1. Tatro Was Wrongly Decided
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thomas and joined by
.Justice Kennedy, rejected the majority's holding on two grounds."
Justice Thomas primarily maintained that the Tatro Court improp-
erly relied on the regulatory definition of "medical services" without
first looking to the plain language of the IDEA.'25 Before turning to
the Department of Education's regulations implementing the IDEA's
"related services" provision, the dissent asserted, the Court in Tatro
should have "first ask[ed] whether Congress has 'directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."'126
Justice Thomas found this omission crucial, as the IDEA states that
schools do not have to provide "medical services" to students, other
than for evaluation or diagnosis, as "related services."2 7 Insisting
that Congress's intent was, in fact, unequivocal, Justice Thomas
concluded that the Court improperly reached outside the scope of
the IDEA.
The dissent next criticized the majority for failing to explain why
services that are medical in nature are not "medical services," as
they would be under other federal laws.' According to Justice
Thomas, the majority incorrectly focused on the provider of the
services, rather than on the nature of the services themselves.12 9 In
further support of its "medical services" interpretation, the dissent
added that "where Congress decided to require a supportive service
. . . that appears 'medical' in nature, it took care to do so
explicitly."' Thus, Congress, in defining "related services," could
124. See id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting National Credit Union Admin. v. First
Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1998) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))).
127. See id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
128. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority's reliance on
the bright-line categorization, according to the dissent, could produce the anomalous situation
where services, while not considered "medical services" under the IDEA, would qualify, for
example, as a federal income tax medical expense deduction. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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have added "nursing services" to the list of services that school
districts are required to provide, but instead chose not to include
them.13 1
2. Assuming Tatro's Precedent Was Correct, It Is Still Not
Controlling
The dissent asserted that because the IDEA was enacted pursu-
ant to Congress's spending power, its text must be analyzed using
"special rules of construction. " 132 Justice Thomas emphasized that
Congress's conditional disbursement of federal funding, as under the
IDEA, must be unambiguous, allowing states to knowingly and
voluntarily accept the terms of the funds. 33 Accordingly, the dissent
reasoned that Spending Clause legislation, like the IDEA, must be
interpreted narrowly to avoid unanticipated fiscal obligations.'
Since the Court had "previously recognized that Congress did not
intend to 'impos[e] . . .a burden of unspecified proportions and
weight," 135 Justice Thomas proposed that the IDEA's "related
services" provision should thus have been interpreted as requiring
school districts to provide "health-related services that school nurses
can perform as part of their normal duties."" 6 Such an interpreta-
tion, the dissent felt, would allow the kind of services performed in
Tatro and exclude those required in Garret F., creating a result
more consistent with Congress's intent to spare school districts from
undue financial hardship.'37 Considering that the cost to provide
Garret's necessary services would be a minimum of $18,000
annually, Justice Thomas found that the majority, in treating this
additional cost as irrelevant, ignored the "constitutionally mandated
principles of construction applicable to Spending Clause legislation
and blindside[d] unwary [school districts] with fiscal obligations
that they could not have anticipated."
38
131. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
190 n.11 (1982)).
133. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
134. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176 n.11).
136. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF GARRET F.
Garret F. unequivocally affirms a physician-based, bright-line test
for determining what necessary nursing services and other health
care a school district must provide for a disabled child. The term
"medical services," as used in the IDEA, clearly does not include
intensive and expensive health care services, even those that
resemble private-duty nursing. These services thus are not ex-
empted services under the IDEA, but rather are "related services"
that must be provided to a student with disabilities. The only health
services that are excluded as "medical services" are those that must
be performed by a licensed physician. The Court has also suggested
that school districts are obligated to provide these services regard-
less of cost.
A. The Court's Ruling in Garret F. Is an Inappropriate Extension
of Tatro
1. The Two Cases Are Irreconcilable
While the Supreme Court's decision in Garret F. is consistent with
its prior ruling in Tatro, the two cases and their holdings cannot be
reconciled. Although the issue considered in each action was nearly
indistinguishable, the material facts in both lawsuits are incongru-
ous. Further, a plain-language review of the IDEA's text does not
support Tatro's provider-specific approach to medical services.
Therefore, the Court in Garret F. was unjustified in applying the
Tatro bright-line test to its analysis.
The Court in Tatro clearly declared that clean intermittent
catheterization was a "related," rather than a "medical," service. 1"9
However, unlike catheterization, a school nurse could not provide
the services Garret required while continuing to attend to his or her
other duties during the day. Assuredly, the frequency in which a
nurse's services were required in these cases was grossly dispropor-
tionate. In Tatro, the nurse needed to spend only a few minutes
with the student every few hours. 4 ' In contrast, Garret required
139. See, Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 895 (1984); see also supra notes
27-35 and accompanying text.
140. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885.
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continuous one-on-one care.'41 The nurse needed to be in very close
proximity to him at all times throughout the day. 42
Also in Tatro, a typical school nurse could easily provide the
requested service with little, if any, additional cost to the school
district.'43 Alternatively, in Garret F., the school district had to
employ additional personnel at a substantial cost."4 However, in
reauthorizing and emphasizing the application of Tatro's test,'45 and
implicitly overruling the Detsel line of cases, 46 the Court has
indicated that the cost of these services is not a determinative factor
in terms of a school district's obligation to provide them.
2. Federalism Concerns
In applying the bright-line Tatro test in Garret F., the Court also
journeyed into forbidden extra-textual statutory interpretation. 47
Garret F. and each of its predecessors involved an interpretation of
congressional intent. The plain language of the IDEA's "related
services" definition expressly states that, except for "diagnostic and
evaluation purposes only," school districts are not required to
provide "medical services" for disabled students."4 Yet, the Court
in Tatro and in Garret F. first turned to the Department of Educa-
tion's regulations to clarify this denotation. 49
Pursuant to our federal government's tripartite structure and
separation of powers, Congress, not the Department of Education,
created the IDEA. Congress affirmatively chose to include specific
language in the definition of "related services." Therefore, employing
a strict reading of the statute, the school district should not have
been required to provide individualized nursing services for Garret,
irrespective of the meaning of "medical services."' 5 Garret was
141. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 995-96.
142. See id.
143. See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893.
144. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992, 1003 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The minimum additional
cost would have been $18,000. See id.
145. See supra text accompanying note 32.
146. See cases cited supra note 39.
147. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
language itself.").
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
149. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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injured and assessed for special education when he was a young
child; thus, his requested services were not solely for diagnostic and
evaluative purposes."'
Conversely, the language of the IDEA does not state that a
school's responsibility for providing a free appropriate public
education terminates when a child's disability becomes so severe
that it becomes burdensome.'52 Thus, the majority was justified in
concluding that the school district's proposed burden-balancing,
multi-factor test was unwarranted based upon its interpretation of
Congress's intent.
B. Should Cost Be Included in the Definition of "Related
Services"?
1. The Result in Garret F. Is Excessively Costly
With advancements in medical science and the opportunities
provided by the IDEA, there has been a sharp rise in the number of
students with costly technology-dependent health care needs
entering the public school system.153 These students require a
significant amount of health-related services throughout their school
day. Some even demand full-time personal nursing services. 54 It is
no wonder that state and local educational agencies have questioned
the extent and expense to which they are responsible for furnishing
special education to these disabled children. The burden is far
greater now than ever before. 5
Congress originally planned to appropriate approximately 40
percent of the total expenses necessary to achieve the IDEA
provisions;"' however, the federal share of funding is currently only
about ten percent, leaving state and local sources to finance the
151. To his credit, Justice Thomas did touch upon the validity of the Court's actions in
pursuing the proper interpretation of this provision in his dissent; however, he could have
gone further to suggest that the services requested in Garret F. were simply not for diagnostic
or evaluative purposes. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
153. See Rozycki, supra note 35, at 67 (citing Dick Sobsey & Ann W. Cox, Integrating
Health Care and Educational Programs, in EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH MULTIPLE
DIsABITEs 155 (Fred P. Orelove & Dick Sobsey eds., 1991)).
154. See id. at 70-71.
155. See Michael D. Simpson, IDEA Ruling: How It Adds Up, NEA TODAY, May 1, 1999,
at 25.
156. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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remainder. 5 The National School Boards Association estimates
that the yearly cost of providing continuous assistance to the
approximately 17,000 technology-dependent students in public
schools totals about $500 million. 5 According to the Department of
Education, this means that while the average excess cost of
educating a child with disabilities is $7021, the federal government
contributes only $702 for each disabled student.'59 It stands to
reason that every dollar spent on a continuous service for one
disabled student reduces the amount that can be spent on other
students, diminishing the quality of education for all. 6
By ruling, in Garret F., that school districts are required to fund
continuous one-on-one nursing services for disabled children, it
appears that the Court would not place a ceiling on what a school
district would be required to spend to fully implement the IDEA's
special education provisions. What the school district in this case
was reaching for, and what several courts have entertained,' 6' (and
what Garret F. rejected) was a defense of undue burden. It can be
argued that the notion of undue burden is implicit in the statutory
concepts of an "appropriate" education and "related" services.'62
But at what amount does the cost of a particular service become
undulyburdensome?63 It apparently does not at $18,000 or $20,000,
as in Garret F. 64 or Morton, respectively.'65 The stances taken by
the parties involved in Morton do illustrate why the inclusion of cost
in the definition of "related services" might be attractive. The
parents, on the one side, argued that any service that would be
necessary to enable their disabled child to benefit from an education
cannot be excluded, and must be provided free of charge, regardless
of the character or expense of the service. 6 The school district, on
157. See Simpson, supra note 155; see also Christopher P. Borreca & David B. Hodgins,
Education of Public School Students with Disabilities, 34 HOuS. LAw. 12, 12 (Apr. 1997).
158. See Simpson, supra note 155.
159. See id.
160. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
161. See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995); Barnett v.
Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California
Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
162. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
163. See Osborne, supra note 41, at 569.
164. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. See Morton Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir.
1998).
166. See id. at 585. The attorney for the parents actually argued that"the sky is the limit."
Id.
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the other hand, took another extreme position that apparently
would exclude most ordinary school nursing services of the kind
routinely provided to nondisabled students.'67
The size and overall wealth of school districts also vary. A cost of
$18,000, as the school board encountered in Garret F., may have
little effect on a large or wealthy school district, while severely
impacting the budget of a small or impoverished district. Addition-
ally, a district, like Cedar Rapids, that already provides expensive
health care services to other students with disabilities, 6 ' may find
that the costs associated with providing extensive one-on-one care
for just one more will leave them strapped for funds.
2. Ancillary Issues
As school systems are increasingly called upon to provide more
intensive levels of services to children with more complex health
care needs, a new set of responsibilities presents itself, raising
serious concerns about liability. In many situations, a student's
particular medical condition may be life-threatening, especially if
proper intervention is not instituted almost immediately. Although
school nurses, classroom teachers, or other practitioners may be
non-medically trained, this does not relieve them of responsibility
if a service is provided ineffectively or improperly. If nonmedical
staff provide nursing services without specific training and an injury
occurs, they may be held to a higher medical standard of care.'69
Providing these types of services may thus be beyond the compe-
tence of school districts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Cedar Rapids Community School District
v. Garret F., has further stressed the interpretation of the "medical
services" exclusion of the IDEA's "related services" provision as first
set out in Tatro. In so doing, the Court indicated that the cost and
character of special education services are irrelevant. 7 ° As long as
167. See id. at 586.
168. See Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 996.
169. See Cynthia A. Dieterich, Health-Related Services under IDEA That Are Medical in
Nature, 100 EDUC. L. REP. 831,839 (1995).
170. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
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the services are genuinely necessary to enable the disabled child to
benefit from an education and cannot be provided outside of school,
the school district must provide the funding.'7 ' The ruling repre-
sents a notice to the lower courts to end the dilution of Tatro-its
bright-line test must be followed.
GarretF., however, has not necessarily guaranteed the uniformity
of result that was expected in subsequent cases. In the few lower
court cases concerning school health care services that have been
decided since Garret F.,172 only one court has held, as did Garret F.,
that a school district is responsible for paying for continuous
nursing services provided to one of its special education students.7 3
To the contrary, inAndrew S. v. School Committee of Greenfield,'74
the court asserted that Justice Stevens did recognize that "the
potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be
relevant to arriving at a sensible construction of the IDEA."" 5
Thus, it appears that courts are still grappling with the issue of
what costs Congress intended for school districts to bear in their
mandate to provide special education services. The task of courts,
however, is to interpret the law as it is written, not rewrite the law
or even pass judgment on the law itself. If courts' interpretations are
not in line with congressional intent, then Congress may need to
amend the IDEA to resolve any further doubt as to what services
must be provided for children with disabilities. Congress has done
this twice before. 6
171. See supra text accompanying note 107.
172. See John T. v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 1999); Andrew S. v.
School Comm. of Greenfield, 59 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Mass. 1999); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. South
Lyon Community Sch., 602 N.W.2d 588 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
173. See Farmers, 602 N.W.2d at 594.
174. 59 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Mass. 1999).
175. Id. at 245 (quoting Garret F., 119 S. Ct. at 999).
176. Congress effectively reversed Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984) (holding
that where relief was allowable under the IDEA, parents could not seek attorney's fees under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act), by amending the IDEA to include an allowance of
attorney's fees, and also effectively reversed Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989)
(allowing Eleventh Amendment immunity), by amending the IDEA to expressly nullify
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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Ultimately, the express language of the IDEA currently specifies
that special education must be provided "at the public's expense."'
But if the quality of education for students diminishes as a result of
decisions like Garret F., Congress must reexamine this issue.
Jennifer L. Barnes
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
